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E.

DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT WAIVED THEIR DEFENSES AND
CLAIMS.
POINT III

First National Bank & Trust of Williston v. Ashtion,
436 N.W. 2d 215 (N.D. 1989)
Freegard v. First West Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616
(Utah 1987)
Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897
(Utah 1990).
Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107;

37

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The

Respondent,

on page

1 *of its Brief,

identifies

one

standard of review applicable to this case, but fails to identify
the standards applicable to all of the issues in this case.

To

facilitate the Court having before it the standards applicable to
the entire case, Appellants set out the following.
The first issue that the Court may address is whether or not
the

trial

court

erred

in

denying

Appellants'

request

for

additional time to conduct discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In reviewing the trial court's
action

in

that

regard,

the

appellate

standard

of

review

is

whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. Sandy City
v.

Salt

Lake

County,

136 Utah Adv.

Rpts.

38

(Utah Ct. App.

1990).
As it relates to the second issue of whether or not the
trial court erred in granting the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the standard of review is as follows:
The granting of summary judgment is appropriate only
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, and in deciding whether the trial court properly
granted judgment, as a matter of law to the prevailing
party, we give no deference to the trial court's view
of the law; we review it for correctness.
Whatcott

v.

Whatcott,

131 Utah Adv. Rpts.

4/4/90).

1

97

(Utah Ct. App.

Additionally, the appellate court is obligated to review the
facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary
judgment was granted.

Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah

Ct. App. 1987).
The third issue to be reviewed by the Court is whether the
trial

court

pursuant

erred

to

in dismissing

a Rule

the Defendants'

12(b)(6) Motion.

Counterclaim

In reviewing

the

trial

court's granting of a motion to dismiss, the Appellate Court is
obliged to construe the Counterclaim in a light most favorable to
the Defendants and to indulge all reasonable inferences in their
favor.
deemed

In essence, the facts alleged in the Counterclaim
to

be

true

and

the

review

alleged, the law provides relief.
Sons

Co.,

790

P.2d

107;

131

is whether,

on

the

are

facts

See Heiner v. S. J. Groves &

Utah

Adv.

Rpts.

69

(Ct. App.

3/30/90); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668; 114 Utah
Adv. Rpts. 26 (Sup. Ct. 8/9/89).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM
WITHOUT ALLOWING DEFENDANTS ADDITIONAL TIME FOR DISCOVERY
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Lewis, based upon
the law and facts of this case, erred in granting

Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Defendants' Counterclaim without allowing sufficient time to conduct discovery.
2

A.

A TRIAL COURT SHOULD DECLINE RULING ON DISPOSITIVE!
MOTIONS WHEN A REASONABLE BASIS HAS BEEN SET OUT IN
A RULE 56(F) AFFIDAVIT AND THE RESISTING PARTY HAS
NOT BEEN DILATORY.

Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the Court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just.
Of course, the purpose of filing a Rule 56(f) affidavit is
to persuade

the Court

to continue

a hearing on a motion

for

summary judgment to permit the resisting party the opportunity to
obtain

affidavits, take

depositions or gather

evidence.

See

generally Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990).
An examination of the factual situations dealt with by the
appellate courts in Utah in prior cases is instructive. One of
the first cases considering the issue is Strand v. The Associated
Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d

191 (Utah 1977).

The plaintiff in that action sued the defendant based upon the
theory

of

libel.

The

complaint

in that

case was

filed

on

February 13, 1976 and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
March 9, 1976, pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

3

On March 22, 1976, defendants filed an affidavit supporting
their motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b).
1976,

On March 25,

plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit wherein he stated

the following:
With respect to defendant's motion regarding sovereign
immunity and their motion to dismiss upon failure to
state a claim, and upon their affidavit regarding the
structure of the Utah Daily Chronicle, the undersigned
requests additional time within which to pursue
discovery to determine the proper party and parties to
be included . . . .
The plaintiff's counsel's affidavit indicated that as of the
date

of

the

Chronicle

alleged

libel, the publisher

of

the

Daily

Utah

and other student-funded publications was not clear.

As a result of the hearing on the motion to dismiss on March 26,
1976,

the

trial

court

issued

on order

dated

March

30, 1976

granting the motion to dismiss.
The Court, in discussing Rule 56(f), stated as follows:
The record shows the affidavit of Nutting to have been
filed four days prior to the hearing. The matters
recited therein concern knowledge and the possession
and control of the defendants; there had not been
sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for
plaintiff to utilize an opportunity to cross-examine
the moving parties . . . under such circumstances, it
was an abuse of discretion to grant defendant's motion.
The Court should have ordered a continuance to permit
discovery, or denied the motion for summary judgment,
without prejudice to its renewal, after adequate time
had elapsed in which plaintiff could have obtained the
desired information.
Id. at 194.

4

The Court

in Strand, supra, cited

favorably the

language

from Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipeline Co., 130 F.2d 1016,
1022 (C. A. 3d 1942):
. the case must, therefore, go back for further
proceedings as to this cause of action in order to
afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to produce
evidence of the facts necessary to support the relief
for which they ask.
It is obvious that this evidence
must come largely from the defendants. This case
illustrates the danger of founding the judgment in
favor of one party, upon his own version of the facts
within his sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits
prepared ex parte.
. . .
The plaintiff should,
therefore, be given a reasonable opportunity, under
proper safeguards, to take the depositions and have the
discovery which they seek . . . .
The Supreme Court of Utah then dealt with the issue in Cox
v. Winters, 678 P. 2d 311

(Utah

1984).

In that case, Donald

Winters, an attorney, met with the plaintiffs in the action to
discuss

an

investment

opportunity

involving

resale of uncut diamonds and gold.
between

the plaintiffs

the purchase

An agreement was reached

and Winters resulting

investment of several thousand dollars.

and

in a cumulative

Each plaintiff was given

a promissory note reflecting the amount of their investment. By
the terms of the notes, plaintiffs were to receive a monthly
return on their investment of 40%.
and

another

Stehl.

individual

Notes were signed by Winters,

as attorneys-in-fact

for the

defendant

When payment was not received, plaintiffs filed their

lawsuit in which Winters and Stehl were both named as defendants.
The defendant Winters filed a motion to dismiss for failure
5

to state a cause of action and the Court ruled on May 12, 1982
that unless the plaintiff amended their complaint within 14 days
to allege fraud, Winters1 motion would be granted.
Two days prior to the entry of the foregoing order, May 10,
1982, plaintiffs sent a set of interrogatories and request for
admissions to the defendant.

Plaintiffs filed their amended

complaint on May 18, 1982 setting forth three causes of action,
with the first and second directed against Winters. The first
cause of action alleged that Winters acted in concert with Stehl
in defrauding the plaintiffs and the second alleged that Winters
acted alone to defraud the plaintiffs.
Thereafter, Winters filed a motion to dismiss, which, upon
approval of the parties, was considered a motion for summary
judgment.

Winters filed with the Court, accompanying his motion

for summary judgment, an affidavit from Stehl confirming the
representations made by Winters as to his involvement in the
transaction.
In opposition to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff
simply filed an objection with no accompanying counter-affidavits. Subsequently, the plaintiff submitted a supplemental
objection wherein they requested, pursuant to Rule 56(f), an
opportunity

to make discovery in order to obtain the facts

necessary to refute the allegations.

On July 29, 1982, nearly

three months after the filing of the amended complaint, the Court
6

granted Winters1 motion for summary judgment.

The Supreme Court

in outlining the test to be used in reviewing the trial court's
holding,

restated

a portion of

its opinion

in Strand,

supra,

stated as follows:
Where, however, the party opposing summary judgment timely
presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f) stating reasons why
he is presently unable to offer evidentiary affidavits he
directly and forthrightly invokes the trial court's
discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion
should be liberally treated, exercising a sound discretion
and the trial court then determines whether the stated
reasons are adequate.
Id. at 312-313.
On

appeal,

Winters

attempted

to

limit

the

holding

in

Strand, indicating that in Strand, the affidavit had been filed
only four days prior to the hearing on the motion.
Cox,

The Court in

supra, indicated that the scope of Strand, should not be

interpreted and apply too narrowly and then continued:
While the sufficiency of time to utilize discovery
proceedings prior to the hearing on summary judgment is
an important and appropriate factor to consider under
Rule 56(f), it is no more so than a fact, existing in
the instant case, that discovery proceedings were
timely initiated, but never afforded an appropriate
response.
The record shows clearly that plaintiffs
initiated discovery to gather facts relative to the
statements made in Stehl T s affidavit, but were never
answered by defendant as required under the rules of
discovery.
Just as a party in Strand was effectively
precluded from utilizing discovery procedures (and
thereby cross-examining the movant), due to the
insufficiency of time (four days), the plaintiffs here
were likewise precluded by reason of d e f e n d a n t s
failure to respond to discovery.
Id. at 314.
7

The Court

in Cox even went

further

in indicating

that a

motion for summary judgment should be denied when discovery has
not been completed, and when the resisting party is in the midst
of discovery.

The Court in Cox stated:

He [Winters] further argues that plaintiffs misstate
the holding in AuerbachT s in that they claim it applies
where a party has been unable to undertake discovery
when in reality it applies only where a party is in the
midst of discovery when a summary judgment motion is
filed (emphasis added).
Id. at 314.

See also Auerbach's v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (Utah

1977).
The

Court,

in

Cox,

followed

the

interpretation

of

Rule

56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and held that a
Rule 56(f) affidavit should be upheld unless a party has failed
to timely utilize available discovery proceedings or is simply
attempting a "fishing expedition" which has failed to produce any
significant evidence.
Finally,

in

Id. at 314.

a case

cited

with

approval

in

Cox,

supra,

Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F.Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
the party opposing
seeking

summary

further discovery

support his claim.
motions

should

be

for

summary

simply

in order to

filed

an

affidavit

"flush out evidence" to

The Court in that case held that Rule 56(f)
granted

adequate opportunity
motion

judgment

liberally

and

that

inasmuch

as an

for discovery had not been provided,
judgment

should

completion of such discovery.
8

be

adjourned

pending

the
the

After complete analysis, the Court in Cox agreed with the
Court in Strand in ruling that the trial court erred and abused
its discretion in granting defendant's motion and should have:
ordered a continuance to permit discovery or deny the
motion for summary judgment, without prejudice, to its
renewal after an adequate time had elapsed in which
plaintiff could have obtained the desired information.
Id. at 315.
The Utah

Court

of Appeals

then dealt with the issue in

Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987).
In that

case, the

Court

following

the ruling

in Cox, supra,

delineated the factors to be considered under Rule 56(f):
1.
Were the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f)
affidavit "adequate", or is the party against whom
summary judgment is sought merely on a "fishing
e x p e d i t i o n " for purely speculative facts after
substantial discovery had been conducted without
producing any significant evidence?
2.
Was there sufficient time since the inception of
the lawsuit for the party against whom summary judgment
is sought to use discovery procedures, and thereby
cross-examine the moving party?
3.
If discovery procedures were timely initiated, was
the non-moving party afforded an appropriate response?
Id. at 278.
In applying the facts of Downtown Athletic Club, supra, the
appellate court found that over a year had elapsed in which the
Downtown Athletic Club could have conducted discovery and that
it had

been given

several

continuances

trial judge to conduct discovery.
9

and extensions by the

The Court found that Downtown

Athletic Club did not articulate in its affidavit any specific
facts that needed further probing and based thereon, ruled that
the Court did not abuse its discretion in that regard. Id. at
279.

See also Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990).
This Court has reviewed Rule 56(f) recently in Sandy City v.

Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rpts. 38 (Utah Ct. App. 6/7/90).
In that case, the Court again restated the standard set out in
Cox, supra that Rule 56(f) motion should be granted liberally to
provide adequate opportunity for discovery unless the movant has
been dilatory or the request is generally lacking in merit.

Id.

at 41. See also Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838,
841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Reeves v. Ggiegy Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
As applied to the facts of this case, it is respectfully
submitted that Judge Lewis abused her discretion in refusing to
allow further discovery.

The Answer and Counterclaim were timely

filed in this case on March 11, 1991 (R. 28-34).

The Defendants

sent their First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on March 1, 1991 and a Certificate of Service
was filed with the Court on March 11, 1991 (R. 3 5 ) .

Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment together with Memorandum, Affidavit
and

Motion

to Dismiss

the Counterclaim

on the basis of

Rule

12(b)(6) (failure to state a cause of action) were all filed on
March 26, 1991 (R. 42-83).
10

It was not until March 29, 1991 that the Plaintiff finally
responded

to

the Defendants'

Interrogatories

and Request

for

Production of Documents.
On April
Opposition

16, 1991, Defendants

to Plaintiff's Motion

filed their Memorandum

for Summary

Judgment

in

and in

Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim
with supporting Affidavit

(R. 88-156).

Counsel for Defendants

filed his Rule 56(f) Affidavit on April 16, 1991 (R. 147-150).
The Plaintiff filed its Reply Memorandum in support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim on April 23, 1991.
The Court sent a notice on June 12, 1991 setting the matter
for argument on July 12, 1991 (R. 189-190).

The trial court on

its own motion, by Minute Entry dated June 21, 1991 moved the
hearing from July 12th to July 9, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. (R. 191-193).
The matter was then continued from July 9th to July 11th because
the failure to receive notice and from July 11th to August 14th
because of scheduling conflicts (R. 194-195).

The Court heard

the arguments on August 14, 1991 and at that time, granted the
Plaintiff's

Motion

to

Dismiss

attorney's fees (R. 198).

the

Counterclaim

and

awarded

In the Plaintiff's responsive brief

herein, Plaintiff takes the position that inasmuch as arguments
on the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss
Counterclaim were not heard until August 14, 1992, the Defendants
11

had

from April

First

Set

of

2, 1991 when they received the Answers to the
Interrogatories

and

Response

to

Request

for

Production of Documents until August (4-1/2 months) in which to
complete any additional discovery.
The

Defendants

have

found

no

case

law

to

support

the

proposition that after a motion for summary judgment has been
filed
that

and
the

a response made, including
resisting

party

must

then

a Rule
somehow

56(f) affidavit,
try

and

schedule

discovery with the Plaintiff before the Court rules on the Rule
56(f) affidavit and motion for summary judgment.

The filing of

the Motion for Summary Judgment and a Response with a Rule 56(f)
Affidavit sets the matter at issue.

The Court must then decide

whether the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment, based upon
the

absence

of

controverted

discovery is necessary.

fact

or

rule

that

additional

Plaintiff fails to cite any authority

for the proposition that after the case is at issue, Defendants
somehow had the duty to forge ahead with discovery even though a
Request for Decision had been filed and the matter had been set
for hearing.

The fact that the case was continued several times

certainly should not have any affect on the sufficiency of the
Rule

56(f) Affidavit

and the right of the Defendants

to move

forward, pursuant to a scheduling order or definitive ruling of
the Court, relative to the discovery rights of the parties.

12

The
Affidavit

Affidavit
(R.

of

147-49),

Counsel

constituting

in summary, detailed

the

Rule

the need

56(f)

for the

following information:
a.
Evidence relating to the relationship between
the Plaintiff, Bradford Group West and the other
financial institutions that it dealt with which
apparently provided the actual money loaned to the
Defendants.
That information would establish the
chronology of the application by the Defendants to the
Plaintiff for the loan proceeds, the dealings between
the Plaintiff and other lending institutions to procure
those funds, the discovery of documents executed in the
case between Plaintiff and the actual loaning bank, and
evidence of the timing of the representations of the
Plaintiff to the Defendants that it in fact was the
originating source of the money lent to the Defendants.
b.
Information regarding the actual
status of The Bradford Group and information
to The Bradford Group's right to originate
documents, service the loan and hold itself
bank.

business
relating
the loan
out as a

c.
Evidence relating to the representations made
by the Plaintiff to the banking organization that
actually generated the original loan proceeds and
evidence concerning disclosures made by the originating
institution to the Plaintiff that were not relayed to
the Defendants.
Additionally, information as to
whether or not the originating bank knew that the
agents and employees of the Plaintiff had represented
that it would continue to work along with the Defend a n t s and refrain from trying to collect the
$100,000.00 as long as the Defendants were making
reasonable progress.
d.
The exact dealings between the Plaintiff and
Defendant with regard to the underlying loan.
Specifically, all of the documents executed between the
Plaintiff and Defendants.
e.
All of the above to assess the Defendants'
defenses, and to establish what fiduciary duty and duty
of good faith the Plaintiff had to the Defendants.
13

It is respectfully submitted that the reasons articulated in
the Rule 56(f) Affidavit are adequate. One example of the problem
created by the inability to obtain discovery is the relegation to
both parties that the Plaintiff, as part of the security for the
$100,000 loan, had taken a second on the shopping mall which is
the subject matter of the original $2,200,000.00 loan (See Motion
for Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond and Stay, and Response
to Motion filed with this Court).

Counsel for Defendants did not

learn until after the case had been decided on summary judgment
that

one of

Defendant
matter

was

of

Approval

the documents executed

a Trust Deed on the mall which

this

of

specifically

between the Plaintiff

action.

In

its

response

Supersedeas Bond

and

Stay

indicated

to

is the
the

subject

Motion

in this Court,

and

for

counsel

that he did not know whether the Trust

Deed existed or not. The existence of that Trust Deed creates the
defense of the One-Action Rule which is discussed hereinafter.
It

is

articulated

respectfully

submitted

that

all

of

the

reasons

in the Affidavit are adequate and provide a clear

picture of the issues that counsel for the Defendants wanted to
address.
As to the second

issue to be addressed

in assessing

the

sufficiency of the Rule 56(f) affidavit, there was not sufficient
time

to pursue

discovery.

Even before

the Answers

to Inter-

rogatories and Response to Request for Production of Documents
14

were

filed

by

the

Summary Judgment.
Memorandum
stated

Plaintiff

to

the

its Motion

for

The Defendants were then required to file a

counsel

for Defendants

Interrogatories

in

did

hand

Defendants

had

an

ongoing

not

when

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
that

filed

in Opposition and file a Rule 56(f) Affidavit.

above,

Answers

Plaintiff,

it

even

As

have

the

received

the

Unless the Court holds
duty

to

continue

with

discovery requests when a Motion for Summary Judgment has been
filed

and

set

for hearing,

there was not sufficient

time to

undertake sufficient discovery.
As to the third issue raised by the cases as to whether or
not the non-moving party was afforded an appropriate response to
discovery

requests, a quick

review

of

the Answers to Inter-

rogatories and Response to Request for Production of Documents
illustrate
herein,

that

were

in

not

fact

the non-moving

afforded

an

party, the

appropriate

Defendants

response.

The

Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 3, 4 and 7 all state
that documents will be provided at a convenient time, and in fact
have never been supplied to this date. (See Addendum to Appellant's original Brief)

The Request for Production of Documents

required all of the documents to be produced to counsel for the
Defendant's office on April 5, 1991 at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

No

production of any documents was ever made by the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff either took objections to the Request for Production of
15

Documents, or agreed to provide the documents, which it failed to
do.

The answers to Interrogatories Nos. 1, 8 and 9 are either

incomplete or evasive.
non-moving

party,

In sum, there can be no question that the

the Defendants herein were not

afforded

appropriate response even to the first set of discovery*
Addendum

to

Appellant's

Brief).

Again,

it

is

an

(See

respectfully

submitted that Defendants did not have a duty to file a Motion to
Compel until the Court made a ruling relating to the Rule 56(f)
affidavit.
Based

upon

the

tests outlined

unequivocally

by

the Utah

Appellate Courts, the trial court should have delayed ruling on
the motions until discovery was completed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS RELATIVE
TO THE RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE
ERROR.

On pages 16 and 17 of Appellant's Brief, the point is made
that the Court failed to make appropriate findings of fact, and
based thereon, this matter should be reversed. In its response,
The Bradford Group makes two arguments. The first relates to the
authority cited from the Appellants.

Respondent contends that

the cases cited were domestic cases and that no authority has
been cited to support the proposition that the failure to enter
findings in this case constitutes reversible error (Respondent's
Brief, p. 21).
16

The second argument made by Respondent is that the trial
court

in

ruling

on

the

issues

presented

by

the

Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment adequately dealt with the facts and
therefore,

no

further

findings

were

necessary

(Respondent's

Brief, p. 21).
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the Court shall find the facts
specially and shall state separately its conclusions of
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58A . . . .
Appellants
prong

approach

have
the

previously
trial

cited

court

should

to the Court the
take

three

in analyzing

deciding the sufficiency of a Rule 56(f) Affidavit.

and

The trial

court must first determine if the Affidavit is adequate; second,
if there has been sufficient time to allow the use of appropriate
discovery procedures; and third, if the discovery procedures were
timely initiated and the non-moving party afforded an appropriate
response. See Sandy City, supra at 42.
Rule 56(f) by the very wording requires the Court to decide
the sufficiency of the Rule 56(f) Affidavit before ruling on the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The

record

in

this

case

establishes

ruling on the Rule 56(f) Affidavit.
17

an

absence

of

any

Contrary to the argument of

the Respondent, the fact that the Court did not find any material
issues

as

it relates

to the Motion

for Summary

Judgment

has

nothing to do with whether or not facts could be developed to
refute

the

Counterclaim.

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

or

to

support

the

Rule 56(f) clearly contemplates its own set of

findings or rulings by the Court.
As noted by the Court in Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436; 110
Utah Adv. Rpts. 27 (Ct. App. 6/1/89), adequate findings of the
Court are those that: (1) are sufficiently detailed; (2) include
enough facts to disclose the process through which the ultimate
conclusion is reached;

(3) indicate the process is logical and

properly supported; and (4) are not clearly erroneous.

Unless

the record meets that standard, the case must be reversed.
The
findings
1989).

Supreme

Court

again

in Reed v. Mutual

restated

the

need

for

of Omaha Co., 776 P. 2d

adequate
896

In that case, the Court stated:

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires the Judge in a bench trial to "find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon." [citing Rules of Procedures] The failure to
enter adequate findings of fact on material issues may
be reversible error.
See, e. g., Acton v. J.D.
Deliriam Corp. , 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). The
findings must be articulated with sufficient detail so
that the basis of the ultimate conclusion can be
understood. See E. G., Id. at 999; Smith v. Smith, 726
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979).
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(Utah

There is no question that the Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah Court of Appeals had both determined

that it is not

necessary for the trial court to enter findings of fact relative
to a granting of a motion for summary judgment because, in that
the granting of a motion for summary judgment presumes that there
are no disputed issues of fact.

See generally Mtn. States Tel. &

Tel., Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258
(Utah 1984); Taylor v. Estate of Grant Taylor, 102 Utah Adv.
Rpts. 36, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 2/15/89).
However, the fact that the court is not required to enter
findings of fact when granting
construed

summary judgment

cannot be

as holding that the trial court need not review

specifically on the adequacy of the Rule 56(f) Affidavit.

As

addressed initially in this Brief, the standard of review before
this Court as it relates to Rule 56(f), is whether or not the
trial court abused its discretion.

If the lower court did not

exercise its discretion, it is impossible to determine if there
is an abuse of discretion.
Inasmuch as the Court was aware of Mr. Anderson's Affidavit
(R. 239-240, 243), and the Court made no ruling with regard to
Rule 56(f), the Court should reverse the matter based upon the
trial court's failure to make findings and examine the issue as
to the need of further discovery.
19

C.

BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S RULING, THE DEFENDANTS HAVE
BEEN PRECLUDED FROM RAISING A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT
ISSUES.
1.

Counterclaim

Fraud and Misrepresentation.

By way of Answer,

and Affidavit, Defendants contend that the agents

and employees of the Plaintiff specifically represented to them
that The Bradford Group was the source of the $2,200,000.00 loan
and that, as it relates to the $100,000.00, the Plaintiff would
take no action to collect the same as long as the Defendants were
moving

along

in good

faith, to obtain the monies

to pay

the

same.

(I. N. Fisher Affidavit, para. 11, R. 153; Fifth Defense,

para. 16 of Defendants' Answer and para. 6 of the Counterclaim,
R. 30-33).
In pages 13-16 of the Appellant's original Brief, Appellants
lay

out 0 the

issues

that

needed

to be addressed

by

discovery

relating to their claim of fraud and misrepresentation that is
both a defense to the Complaint and an element of the Counterclaim.
The
fraud

Respondents

contend

and misrepresentation

that the Appellants' defenses of
were waived

contractually

by

the

execution of the forbearance and extension agreements executed by
the Defendants.

(See p. 34-36 of Appellants' Brief, and the

Forbearance and Extension Agreement, R. 65, para. 13, R. 68-71).
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Generally,
introduction

the

of

parol

evidence

rule

would

contemporaneous. conversations,

prohibit
statements

the
or

representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to
the terms of an integrated contract.

See E.I.E. v. St. Benedicts

Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc.
v.

Lentz,

28 Utah

2d

261, 266,

501

P.2d

266,

270

(1972).

However, as noted by the Court in Union Bank v. Swenson, 706 P.2d
663 (Utah 1985):
This general rule [the parol evidence rule] as stated,
contained an exception for fraud.
Parol evidence is
admissible to show the circumstances under which the
contract was made, or the purpose for which the writing
was executed.
This is so even after the writing is
determined to be an integrated contract.
Admitting
parol evidence in such circumstances avoids the
judicial enforcement of a writing that appears to be a
binding integration, but in fact is not.
What appears to be a complete and binding
integrated agreement may be a forgery, a
joke, a sham, or an agreement without
consideration, or it may be voidable for
fraud, duress, mistake, or the like, or it
may be illegal.
Such invalidating causes
need not and commonly do not appear on the
face of the writing.
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, §214, Comment (1981).
Union Bank, supra, at 665.
To understand the significance of the holding in Union Bank,
a

summary

recital of the facts is important.

The

appellants

Swenson executed a promissory note in favor of Union Bank.
appellant

Ron

Swenson

also

signed
21

the

note

for

the

The

lumber

company.

Upon default, the plaintiff brought the action to

recover on the note.
In response, the appellants contended that none of the
defendants intended their signatures to have effect, and that the
representatives of the bank had promised the Swensons that their
signatures were for appearance only, and that no collection
action would be brought against them personally.

Each of the

defendants signed affidavits alleging that the bank officers told
the appellants that their personal signatures were needed to
satisfy the bank auditors and loan committee.
applying

The trial court,

the parol evidence rule found no genuine issue of

material fact and granted summary judgment.
In reviewing the matter, the Court stated as follows:
Protection against judicial enforcement of writings
that appear to be binding integrations, but in fact are
not lies in the provision that all relevant evidence is
admissible on the threshold issue of whether the
writing was adopted by the parties as an integration of
their agreement. This appears to be so, even if the
writing clearly states it is to be a complete and final
statement of the parties agreement.
Id. at 665.
The Court found in the Union Bank case that the record did
not include a specific factual determination of whether or not
the note was an integration.

The Court found that the affidavit

in fact presented a genuine issue of material fact requiring a
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specific

determination

integration.

as to whether or not the note was an

Id. at 666.

Finally, the Court in Union Bank stated the following with
regard to parol evidence:
parol evidence is admissible to prove that a
party was induced into a contract by fraud, despite a
determination that a writing is an integrated contract.
E.I.E., supra; B. D. Moran, Inc. v. First Security
Corp. , 82 Utah 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933); State Bank of
Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977);
Bullfrog Marina, supra; Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d
252, 255, 451 P.2d 769, 770-71 (1969).
Id. at 666.
The Court in Union Bank cites a number of cases from other
states so holding. There is simply no question that the issue of
when the Defendants knew that the Plaintiff was not the lending
institution and had knowledge that the representations made by
the Plaintiff as to its status and when the $100,000.00 would be
due,

are all genuine issues of fact raised legitimately by the

Affidavit of I. N. Fisher (R. 151-56).

Further discovery could

only strengthen the existence of those issues.
2.

One-Action

Approval

of

Revised

attached

the

Second

Rule. Attached

Supersedeas

Bond,

to
the

their

Motion

Appellants

for
have

Deed of Trust given to the Plaintiff

to

secure the $100,000 obligation on the shopping mall which was the
subject matter of the original $2,200,000.00 loan.

The Plain-

tiffs, in this action, seek to proceed against the guarantors
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without first exhausting the real estate given to them contemporaneously

with

the

execution

of

the

$100,000.00

Note

(See

Motion for Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond and Motion for
Stay on Appeal filed with this Court).
The One-Action Rule is stated in Utah Code Annotated §78-371 (1965 as amended):
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or
the enforcement of any rights secured solely by
mortgage upon real estate, which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with
costs and disbursements, and the sale of the mortgage
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount
and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to
proceed and sell the same according to the provisions
of law relating to sales on execution, and a special
execution or order of sale shall be issued for that
purpose.
There have been a plethora of cases in Utah dealing with the
One-Action Rule.
common-law

Basically, the One-Action Rule overrules the

right of

a creditor to choose

any or all

remedies

available to him in pursuing a debt by forcing the creditor to
proceed according to the judicial interpretation of a statutory
foreclosure scheme.

In Utah, the remedies available have been

well documented:
Where a creditor owns a debt secured by a deed of trust
or chattel mortgage containing the power of sale, two
remedies are available.
He may proceed under the
power, or foreclose in a manner provided by law for the
foreclosure of mortgages.
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Morgan v. Layton, 60 Utah 280, 208 P. 505 (1922); Barker v.
Utah-Idaho Cent R.R., 57 Utah 494, 195 P. 635 (1921); Stevens v.
Improvement Co., 20 Utah 267, 58 P. 843 (1899).
In recent years, the Court has expanded the One-Action Rule
in

two

ways.

First,

the

debtor

can

assert

the

rule

as

an

affirmative defense to the creditor's premature attempt to obtain
a personal

judgment through an action on the underlying note.

See G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, §8.2, at
599.

Had the facts been discovered in this case, the One-Action

Rule could have been asserted by the Defendants in that manner.
It is clear under the One-Action Rule that a creditor may not
obtain a personal
real

property

judgment against the debtor until after the

security

has

been

exhausted.

See

generally

Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Utah
1983); G. Nelson and D. Whitman, supra, Note 18 at §8.2.
The second application to the One-Action Rule occurs where a
creditor proceeds against the debtor's general assets. Cases have
held that even though the debtor may have failed to use the OneAction

Rule

as an

affirmative

defense, the

debtor can still

assert the rule as a sanction against the creditor for not having
first foreclosed on the security.

See G. Nelson and D. Whitman,

supra, Note 18, §8.2 at 599 and Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal
3d 729, 518 P.2d 329 (1974).

It is the second means that the
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Defendants attempted to use in obtaining the stay on appeal.
(See Appellant's Motion for Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond,
Memorandum and Affidavit).
As applied to the facts of this case, the Plaintiff took a
second mortgage on the shopping center, which is the subject
matter of this action (see Memorandum and Affidavit in Support of
Appellant's Motion for Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond filed
with this Court) and should be precluded

from pursuing the

Defendants personally, until the collateral is exhausted.
Addressing possible defenses to the imposition of the OneAction Rule, the fact that the Plaintiff has only a second
mortgage on the property

is not enough to excuse it from

foreclosing on the real estate.

Even if the Defendants contended

that their second mortgage was worthless, such a claim would not
avoid the imposition of the sanctions associated with the OneAction Rule.

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed that issue in

Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d

1333 (Utah

1983), and held that before claiming that the collateral is
worthless and therefore that the creditor had no obligation to
foreclose upon the real property, that the holder of a second
deed of trust could not merely speculate that foreclosure of the
first deed of trust would complete exhaust the collateral.

The

Court held that security in the real property must in fact be
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exhausted and any deficiency established to a certainty before
the exception would apply.

Id. at 1336.

See also City Consumer

Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 160 Utah Adv. Rpts. 16, 17 (Utah Ct. App.
5/8/91);

and Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge #1453, 88

Utah 577, 583, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936).
The
waivers

Plaintiff
contained

has asserted,

that the Defendants

in the Forbearance

and Extension

executed

Agreements

that they signed. However, all Courts addressing the issue have
uniformly ruled that one cannot waive the protection of the OneAction Rule.

The Courts have analogized waiver in that situation

to a person signing
judicial

or

repossession

a home mortgage and waiving the right to

non-judicial
and

immediate

foreclosure
assessment

and
of

allowing

immediate

a deficiency.

See

generally Winkleman v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. 2d 387, 88 P.2d 147
(1939); Nevada Whole-Sale Lumber Co. v. Myers Realty, Inc., 92
Nev. 24, 544 P.2d 1204 (1976).
In

this

case,

James

F.

Kern

and

I. N.

Fisher

are

the

principals of Loran Corporation, a California corporation, which
corporation is also the general partner in a California limited
partnership known as "SLC Limited IV."

The Defendants Kern and

Fisher are the guarantors who, in addition to Loran Corporation,
were sued in the present action.

The fact that Kern and Fisher

are guarantors, but at the same time, are the principals of Loran
27

Corporation still gives them the right to invoke the One-Action
Rule.
742

See McCloskey v. M, P. J. Co., 70 N.J. Super. 46, 174 A.2d

(N.J.

addressed

Super.
the

Ct. ATP, Div.

issue,

has

1961).

determined

California, which
that

under

has

California

guaranty law, a Court may consider a guarantor to be a co-obligor
of the underlying debt, thus precluding any proceedings against
the guarantor without

first foreclosing on the security.

See

Component Sys. Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 101 Nev. 76,
92 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (1985).
In a similar

action, the Court in First National

Bank

&

Trust of Williston v. Ashtion, 436 N.W. 2d 215 (N.D. 1989), dealt
with a case where the guarantors were personally liable on the
underlying note and deed of trust.

The Court reasoned that the

guaranty did not enlarge the guarantors1

liability and the One-

Action Rule prevented the bank from pursuing the action against
the guarantors based upon the guaranty.

See also Lawyers & Home-

Makers Building & Loan Assoc, v. Kohn, 14 N.J. Misc. 153, 183 A.
467 (N.J. Super.), reversed on other grounds, 117 N.J.L. 238, 187
Atlanta 538, (N.J. 1936).
In summary, it appears that the Plaintiff

is barred

from

proceeding in this action on the guarantees without foreclosing
by the One-Action Rule.

Had the Court allowed discovery to take

place and either force the Plaintiff to produce its documents, or
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allow a Motion to Compel, that issue could have been determined
and made part of the litigation.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A thorough discussion of the issues warranting this Court's
reversal of the Order Granting Summary Judgment is set out in the
Appellants'
Appellants

original
seek

only

brief
to

(Appellants'

discuss

those

Brief,

issues

p.

20-35).

raised

by

the

Respondent in their Reply Brief.
A.

THE PLAINTIFF IS GOVERNED BY THE FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ACT.

The Plaintiff goes to great lengths to argue that the Utah
Financial Institutions Act, Utah Code Annotated §7-1-101 et seq.
(1981 as amended), does not apply to the Plaintiff because the
Plaintiff is not "a financial institution" (Appellants' Brief, p.
22-24).

That argument is refuted by the clear language of the

Act. There is no question that Utah Code Annotated §7-1-501 (1987
as amended), lists the persons and institutions that are subject
to the jurisdiction of the Department
supervision

and

examination

by

addition,

the

the

and are subject to the
Department

of

Financial

Institutions.
However,

in

Financial

Institutions

Act

contains certain statutory controls applicable to all persons and
29

entities,

residing

or

doing

business

in Utah whether

or not

specifically identified in Utah Code Annotated §7-1-501 (1987 as
amended).
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-701(1) states as follows:
It is unlawful for any person not authorized to conduct
a business subject to the jurisdiction of this
department to use a name, sign, advertisement,
letterhead, or other printed matter which represents,
or in any other manner to represent to the public that
that person, or its place of business, is a financial
institution, or is conducting a business which is
subject to the jurisdiction of the department.
The statute could not be clearer.

The statute makes it

unlawful for any person, whether or not that person is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Financial Institutions Act to hold itself
out

as

a

financial

institution.

To

somehow

argue

that

the

portion of the statute outlined above pertains only to financial
institutions
restrict

is

ludicrous. The

persons not under

intent

of

the regulation

the

section

and control

is
of

to
the

Financial Institutions Act from representing to the public that
they are legitimate financial institutions.
To that same end, Utah Code Annotated §7-1-701(2) provides
as follows:
. No person not authorized to conduct a banking
business under Chapter 3 may transact business in this
state under any name, or use any name or sign, or
circulate or use any letterhead or bill head which
contains the word "bank", "banker", or "banking", or
any other word or combination of words indicating that
the business is a business of a bank.
Such a person
30

may not advertise or represent in any manner which
indicates or reasonably implies that its business is of
the character or kind carried on by a bank, or which is
likely to lead any person reasonably to believe that
its business is that of a bank, or in the case of a
federal or state savings bank, that its business is
other than that of a savings bank. . . .
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-304 (1981 as amended), gives the
Commissioner of the Utah Financial Institutions power to bring
appropriate civil action to:
prevent or restrain any persons from engaging in this
state in any business subject to the jurisdiction of
the department without first having obtained the
authority to do so as provided in this title, or from
violating any other provisions of this title or any
rule, regulation, or order of the Commissioner
(emphasis added).
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-701(9) (1989 as amended), provides
as follows:
Every person, corporation, association, or other
business entity, and every officer of the corporation
or association violating the provisions of this section
is guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor, and each stay of
the violation shall constitute a separate offense.
There simply can be no question based upon the

foregoing

that the Financial Institutions Act does in fact apply to the
Plaintiff.

In its Brief, the Plaintiff acknowledges that it is

not licensed or authorized by the Financial Institutions Act to
use the name

"bank" in its name, and therefore, the Plaintiff

admits a violation of the Financial Institutions Act.
B.

USE OF THE TERM "BANK" DOES VIOLATE THE FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ACT.
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Respondents argue on pages 24 through 26 of its Brief that
the Plaintiff has not improperly used a derivative of the "bank"
in its name.

It is unnecessary to recite the provisions of the

Utah Financial
person

not

Institutions Act again.

licensed

and

authorized

The Act prohibits any

by the Utah Department

of

Financial Institutions to use the word "bank" or any derivative
in its name.

There is not an exception for "mortgage banker" or

"investment banker", or any of the terms used by the Plaintiff in
this case.
Respondent then argues on page 26 of his Brief that Utah
Code Annotated 7-1-701(8)(a) applies:
Notwithstanding any other restriction in this section,
the prohibition of the use of specific names and words
in subsections (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) does not
apply if the effect of the use of the name or word
would not likely lead any person to reasonably believe
that a person or his place of business is a financial
institution, or is conducting a business subject to the
jurisdiction of the Department.
That issue is put to rest by virtue of paragraph 11 of I.N.
Fisher's Affidavit wherein he testifies:
Throughout the entire transaction with the Plaintiff
originating with the loan of $2,200,000.00, the agents
and employees of the Plaintiff represented themselves
as a banking institution authorized within the State of
Utah to so act . . . . (R. 153).
C.
On
contends

THE CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE DEFENDANTS
SUPPORT THEIR DEFENSE AND CLAIMS.
pages
that

29-31
even

of
if

the
the

Respondent's
Plaintiff
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Brief,

violated

the

Respondent
Financial

Institutions

Act,

that

there

is

no

authority

to

void

the

transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
As discussed hereinafter, if a private cause of action is
generated from the Utah Financial Institutions Act, the Court has
the province

to determine

the appropriate

sanction and damage

that may be recovered.
The
compares

Respondent, at the trial court
the

facts

of

this

case

to

level

one

and on appeal,

where

one

individual lends money to another private individual.
of

the Respondent

is that

since there

is no statute

private
The claim
in Utah

prohibiting a private person from lending money, the Court should
not impose any sanction.
There are many things that a lay person could do for another
individual that a lawyer or doctor might do.
himself
money

out

as a doctor

in that

capacity

and performed
when

in

If a person held

services

and

fact he was not

collected

so trained,

certified or licensed, a doctor should not be able to contend
that inasmuch as he was only doing tasks that a lay person could
do, no sanction should apply.
fraud

and misrepresentation

Such a person would be guilty of

and the very

least that the Court

should do is to require the individual to disgorge the profits
and pay the damages caused by his conduct.
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The 20th Century has presented incident after incident that
has

culminated

regulations

in

very

pertaining

strict

federal

to banking.

and

state

Individual

laws

and

and

national

crises have been caused by loose handling of financial affairs.
All of us assume certain things when we take our money to an
institution

that

holds

itself

out

as a bank.

Our

level of

expectation regarding performance and ability is much higher in
dealing with a "bank11 than if we are dealing with

a neighbor or

individual person. Thus, in this case, Defendants

respectfully

submit to the Court that it is appropriate that the Plaintiff be
precluded

from recovering

Defendants

because

fees, interest

it entered

into

the

and profits

from

the

transaction

with

the

Defendants and intentionally held itself out as a bank.
D.

A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS TO ENFORCE THE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT.

On pages 31-33 of Respondent's Brief, Respondent

contends

that a private cause of action cannot be implied from the Utah
Financial Institutions Act.
The

first

appellants'

argument

analysis

and

raised

by

argument

Respondent
are without

Appellants had cited federal statutes and cases.
of the area demonstrates that a myriad of

is

that

basis

the

because

A quick review

state courts have

implied the exact same analysis as that outlined in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1974).

For instance in Fasse v. Lower Heating
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and Air Conditioning, Inc., 241 Kans. 387, 736 P.2d 930 (Kans.
1987), the Court stated as follows:
Courts do not require explicit statutory authorization
for familiar remedies to enforce statutory obligations.
When the legislature has left the matter at large for
judicial determination, the Court's function is to
decide what remedies are appropriate in light of the
statutory language and purpose and their traditional
modes by which courts compel performance of legal
obligations.
If civil liability is appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not
denied this traditional remedy because it is not
specifically authorized.
Id. at 934.
U.S.

246, 71

See also Montana-Dakota Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 341
S. Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed

912

(1951);

State ex rel.

Phillips v. Wm. Liquor Bd., 59 Wash. 2d 565, 369 P.2d 844 (1962);
Branson v. Branson, 190 Okla. 347, 123 P.2d 643 (1942).
Second, Respondent contends that the elements required by
the Cort v. Ash, supra analysis are not met in this matter.

The

factors include: (1) whether the Plaintiff was one of the class
for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there was
any

indication

of

legislative

intent, explicit

or

implicit,

either to create such a remedy or to deny one; and (3) whether
implication of such a remedy was consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme.
of

this

case, the

statute

As it relates to the facts

explicitly

prohibits

an entity or

individual holding themselves out as a bank when in fact they are
not so authorized and licensed. Established by affidavit in this
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case, the agents and employees of the Plaintiff held The Bradford
Group out as a bank.
brush analysis."
of

the

Those concise facts do not present a "broad

Rather, the facts present a specific violation

Financial

Institutions

Act

by

the

Plaintiff

victims of that specific violation are the Defendants.

and

the

Certain-

ly, one cannot argue that the Defendants in this case are not
members of the class of persons sought to be protected by the
prohibi- tion against misrepresentation as to banking status.
As to the second element, Utah Code Annotated §7-l-102(1)(a)
states in part as follows:
The legislature finds that it is in the public interest
to strengthen the regulation, supervision and examination of persons, firms, corporations, associations and
other business entities furnishing financial services
to the people of this state or owning and controlling
those businesses.
The legislature further finds that
there has been substantial changes in the structure of
financial services 1 industry and the nature and
characteristics of the institutions and other business
entities furnishing those services . . . .
(d) It is the intent of the legislature that the
provisions of this title be interpreted and implemented
to promote those purposes.
The
Financial

intent

of

the

Institutions

Utah
Act

be

Legislature
interpreted

was

that

and

the

Utah

implemented

to

promote the explicit purpose of strengthening the supervision of
business entities furnishing financial services to the people of
this

State.

fulfills

that

Certainly,
purpose.

implying
The

only
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a private
effective

cause

of

remedy

action
against

violators of the Act is to allow a private cause of action.

The

victim who loses money or is wronged by virtue of a violation of
the Financial Institutions Act can only be fully compensated if a
private cause of action exists.
of

the

legislature

financial
Utah.

was

institutions

A

cease

and

to

Certainly, one of the purposes

strengthen

the

laws

relating

to

and protect the people of the State of
desist

order

entered

against

an

entity

violating the Act does nothing to compensate the person who is
wronged.

The best way to insure that entities or individauls

abide by the terms of the Utah Financial Institutions Act is to
allow that person to be compensated when wronged.
The third element certainly is met in this case. A private
cause of

action allowing

Financial

Institutions Act is violated is certainly

consistent

with

underlying

scheme

to

examination

of

the

strengthen

the

a victim

purpose

regulation,

of

to be compensated when the

the

legislative

supervision

and

entities rendering financial services to others.
E.

DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT WAIVED THEIR DEFENSES AND CLAIMS.

On pages 34-36, the Respondent contends that the guarantors
waived their claims and defenses.
There is nothing

in the record to substantiate a waiver.

The Defendants in this case acknowledge that they agreed to pay a
$100,000.00 loan fee.

That is not the issue before the Court.
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The issue before the Court is the fact that the Plaintiff misrepresented itself as a bank and further misrepresented to the
Defendants

that

it was

the originator

of the

loan and

could

influence when the loan would be called due and when extensions
would be given.

It is on the basis of those misrepresentations

that the Defendants contend that they are not required to pay the
$100,000.00.

The Defendants did not have any knowledge that the

Plaintiff was not in fact a bank and did not have the right to
grant further extensions until the lawsuit was filed.

At best,

the issue relating to the Defendant's knowledge is one which is
in fact disputed, and is not included in the undisputed
relied upon by the trial court.

facts

Accordingly, waiver is certainly

not a bar to the Defendant's contention.
Defendants have previously addressed the issue of fraud as
an exception to the parol evidence rule and will not readdress it
in this Point.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIM
The

Defendants

in

their

Counterclaim

allege

that

The

Bradford Group held itself out as a banking organization and that
in

that

capacity,

The

Bradford

Group

took

payment

from

the

Defendants for fees, origination costs and the like which would
normally be paid to banks or bankers.
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Additionally, Defendants

allege that regard to the transaction with the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff

failed

to disclose

that

the

loan proceeds were

generated by another financial institution, and otherwise failed
to disclose important and relevant financial information to the
Defendants.

As a result of the conduct of the Plaintiff, the

Defendants contend that they are entitled to all fees paid to the
Plaintiff, interest payments, extension fees, legal fees and the
like (R. 32-33).

In the Affidavit of I. N. Fisher (R. 151-156),

the Defendant specifically allege that the Plaintiff misrepresented not only its status, but when the $100,000.00 would be
due.

The Defendants operated under the assumption as long as

they were making reasonable progress, the $100,000.00 would not
be called due.

As a result of that misrepresentation, the

Defendants have been sued, been obligated to pay the costs of
the litigation and suffered other damage for which they are
entitled to recover.

The Counterclaim was dismissed based upon

the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Court has held that:
When we review a judgment entered on a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure: "we are obliged to construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor."
Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935,
936 (Utah 1988); see also Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,
Inc. , 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Mounteer v. Utah
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Power & Light Co., 773 P. 2d 405, 406 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
A motion to dismiss will be affirmed only
"where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to relief under any state of
facts which could be proved in support of its claim.
Arrow, 767 P.2d at 936; see also Freegard v. First West
Nat y l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987); Mounteer,
773 P.2d at 406.
Heiner,

supra

at

107.

See

also

Golding

v.

Ashley

Central

Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990).
As set out before, the issue of waiver
factual issues that need to be resolved.

and estoppel

are

It is the contention of

the Plaintiff that the Defendants1 Counterclaim is barred by the
doctrine of waiver, certainly cannot be disposed of by a Motion
to Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. As indicated by the cases set out above, the contentions

outlined

in

the

Counterclaim

must

be

deemed

as true.

Certainly, the Defendants have a cause of action for fraud and
misrepresentation, and based thereon, the Motion to Dismiss the
Counterclaim should be reversed and remanded.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff in this case seeks to collect a $100,000.00
fee

for brokering

based

upon

alone.

Defendants respectfully

the misrepresentation,

violation

submit

of the

that

Financial

Institution Act and its conduct in seeking to collect from the
guarantors
decision

of

before
the

foreclosing
lower

court

on the real property,
should be reversed
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that

the

and that

the

Defendants1 Counterclaim be remanded for a factual determination
and judgment.

DATED this _ /

day of May, 1992•

RY ^/ANDERSON, ESQ.
Att^rpey for Defendants/Appellants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

/

day of May, 1992, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following,
postage prepaid.

Scott F. Young, Esq. #3890
Mark F. James, Esq. #5295
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147.
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ADDENDUM
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GARY J. ANDERSON, #4457
Attorney for Defendants
Central Park East
1815 South State, Suite 3500
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 224-6660
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES F. KERN, an individual
I.N. FISHER, an individual,
and LORAN CORPORATION, a
California corporation,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS

SUBMIT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

herewith

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

Civil No. 910900291CV

the

following

Request

for

Production of Documents to the Plaintiff:
The Defendant is required to provide the following described
documents at the law offices of ANDERSON & BLACK, Central Park
East, 1815 South State Street, Suite 3500, Orem, Utah 84058 on
April 5, 1991 at 9:00 a.m.
(1)

All documents referenced in Defendants' First Set of

Interrogatories.
(2)

All

documents

of

every

type

or

nature

within

your

possession which relate to the transaction with the Defendant

from the execution of the construction loan documents on December
4, 1985 to the present.

Without limiting the generality of the

request, specific request is made for all contracts, attachments,
notes,

trust

deeds, guarantees, correspondence,

files, inter-

office memoranda or work papers.
(3)

All

documents

within

the

Plaintiff's

possession

relating to the loan arrangements with the Defendant originating
with

the

Loan

Agreement

dated

December

4,

1985

and

as

it

specifically relates to monies the Plaintiff obtained to finance
said

loan

from

Dime

Bank,

any

other

banks

including

specifically located in Idaho.

DATED this 1st day of March, 1991.

/s/
GARY J. ANDERSON, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
391\LORAN.RFP
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